



Is institutional trust related to the
attitudes towards immigrants in
Europe? A study of majority
and minority population

Vivika Halapuu, Tiiu Paas and Tiit Tammaru

Is institutional trust related to the attitudes towards immigrants in Europe? A study of majority and minority population¹

Vivika Halapuu, Tiiu Paas, Tiit Tammaru²

University of Tartu, Estonia; Norface project MIDI-REDIE

Abstract

The paper examines the factors that are related to attitudes towards immigrants in Europe, with a particular focus on the role of institutional trust in shaping these attitudes. We go one step further compared to previous studies by investigating separately two different groups of people — members of the ethnic majority and ethnic minority populations in European countries. We use data from the European Social Survey fourth round database for 27 countries. The main finding is that social trust is important for both groups, while trust in institutions is more strongly related to the attitudes among ethnic majorities. Other biggest differences between members of the ethnic minority and majority population are related to type of area where one lives, human capital and economic factors. The first two are more strongly related to the attitudes towards immigrants for the majority populations, while economic factors (especially labour market status) are more important for the minority populations in European countries.

Keywords: immigration, attitudes, trust in institutions, minority/majority populations

JEL Classification: J61, J15, C31, P51

¹ Financial and scientific support is acknowledged from the NORFACE research program on Migration in Europe - Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics (project MIDI-REDIE, *Migrant Diversity and Regional Disparity in Europe*). The authors of the paper are also grateful to the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research (grant No. SF0180037s08) for their support. We are thankful for the valuable feedback and comments received from our colleagues and project partners during several seminars and discussions. Particularly thankful we are for our MIDI-REDIE project partner Professor Jacques Poot for his constructive comments and encouragement. Views expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors and, as such, should not be attributed to other parties.

² Emails of the authors: Vivika Halapuu – vivika.halapuu@hm.ee; Tiiu Paas - tiiu.paas@ut.ee; Tiit Tammaru - tiit.tammaru@ut.ee

I. Introduction

European countries are becoming ethnically more and more diverse as a result of immigration all across the globe. Along with the positive effects of immigrants on European societies, such as slowing the down the trend of population aging and filling up the important segments of the labour market, we can also witness a growing trends of intolerance towards immigrants that potentially undermines the positive effects of immigration among members of the native majority population. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) highlighted in its 2011 annual report that racism and intolerance towards immigrants are both on the rise in Europe. This is not a recent trend — in a racism survey published in 2005 it was also mentioned that Europeans are becoming more and more xenophobic, whereas the intolerance was found to be at the highest levels in the Baltic States (PUUDUB VIIDE). Furthermore, according to OECD International Migration Outlook 2010, even the people who see benefits that arise from immigration prefer a slowdown of immigration in the future.

Several scholars have studied the factors that shape the attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Husfeldt 2004, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006, Masso 2009, McLaren 2010, Rustenbach 2010, Andreescu 2011). The focus is often on economic factors and on contacts with immigrants in different life domains. This study examines the role of institutional trust in shaping the attitudes towards immigrants among members of the minority and majority population. The focus on trust is important for several reasons. First, trust is one of the most important synthetic forces within society that ties people together with each other and stimulates cooperation between its members (Simmel 1950, 326). Institutional trust is one of the key dimensions of trust in society and it shows how people perceive how well the institutions are operating (Stokes 1962, Miller 1974, Hetherington 1998). In the context of studies of attitudes towards immigrants the changeable nature of institutional trust cannot be neglected. Trust in institutions, including political institutions, are not as stable as social trust. Institutional trust might change over individual's lifespan as a result of different experiences but also as a response to policy outcomes, information about politics etc. The changeability further means that institutional trust (and the phenomena affected by that) can be partly managed by people on power. Institutional trust itself has many components such as attitudes towards institutions, individual policy considerations, policy outcomes etc.

Data for the study comes from European Social Survey (EES) fourth round database for 27 European countries. We will implement principal component factor analysis in order to elaborate aggregated indicators of pro-immigrants attitudes and trust in institutions. we will regress institutional trust on aggregated indicators of European peoples' attitudes towards immigrants, controlling for relevant background characteristics. We run separate models for members of the majority and minority populations. To the best of our knowledge, this is so far the first paper on the attitudes towards immigration that uses that kind of distinction. We find this distinction to be important since ethnic majority population attitudes towards immigrants might be rather different from those of ethnic minority population. Further, the determinants of the attitudes might be different as well for those two groups.

2. Theoretical framework for examining the determinants of people's attitudes towards immigration

2.1. Concepts of trust, social trust, political trust and trust in institutions

According to Levi and Stroker (2000), there is no consensus about what does trust mean. The definition by Delhey and Newton (2005) which says that trust is “*the belief that others will not, at worst, knowingly or willingly do you harm, and will, at best, act in your interests*”, however, concludes it rather well. Social scientists see trust as a key element of society (Espenshade ja Hepstead 1996), as it makes people to put themselves into vulnerable situations, where another subjects of society might harm them. Moreover, according to Bianco (1994) trust links citizens to the institutions that are intended to represent them making thus the existence of democracy possible.

Trust exists in various forms. Newton (2001: 203) emphasized on differences between social and political trust by claiming that they are not different aspects of the same thing. Moreover, they might not be even related to each other. Differentiation between these two has been made by many other authors as well (see e.g. Braithwaite, Levi 1998, Eek, Rothstein 2005, Lee, Yu 2009). Social trust (also called horizontal trust) which is essential for cultivating ground for stability and peaceful relations that are the basis for productive cooperation of people (Newton 2001) is defined as trust in other people. According to Herreros, Criado (2009: 339), social trust is defined as trust in strangers. Some other authors, however, call so defined concept as general social trust (Newton 2012, Bjørnskov, Svendsen 2012). Newton (2012) distinguished between particular social trust – trust in known others (friends, family, neighbours) – and general social trust – trust in unknown others.

Political trust which is defined as a basic evaluative orientation toward the government founded on how well the government is operating according to people's normative expectations (Stokes 1962, Miller 1974, Hetherington 1998) is similar the general social trust in a sense, as it assumes trusting unknown others. At the same time it is different from social trust. While social trust is according to some scholars (see Erikson 1950; Allport 1961; Cattell 1965) an individual property which is associated with individual characteristics, either core personality traits, or individual social and demographic features such as class, education, income, age, and gender, political trust is primarily seen as a reflection of people's political lives, not their personalities nor even their social characteristics (Levi and Stoker 2000: 481).

Political trust is associated with a set of political variables (Newton 2001: 204). Hetherington (1998) considered political trust to be a function of presidential approval, institutional evaluation, one's policy considerations, the quality of policy outcomes, media (as a distributor of positive and negative information people receive about government), perceptions about social and cultural change, but also of some social characteristics, such as age, race, education, income and gender. This approach demonstrates the scope of the phenomenon and at the same time shows that evaluations of institutions and trust in them are only a part of the political trust. This argument is also supported by Easton (1965) who draws an important distinction between two types of that – specific and diffuse support. The first of these refers to satisfaction with government outputs and the performance of political authorities. Diffuse

support refers to the public's attitude toward regime-level political objects regardless of performance.

Although in some studies political trust and trust in institutions have been equalized (e.g. Berg and Hjerm (2010) defined political trust as the trust individuals have in their state-wide legal–political institutions and actors), we follow the distinction made by Newton and Easton. In this paper main attention is paid on trust in institutions (also institutional trust) that is defined as *people's belief that country's institutions not, at worst, knowingly or willingly do them harm, and will, at best, act in everybody's interests.*

2.3. Why does trust to institutions matter in the context of migration?

There are not many studies that have explored the relationship between institutional trust and attitudes towards immigrants. The few studies that have done it have found an expected relationship between them. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) were the first who among other hypotheses explored the one of political alienation. They draw on Uchitelle (1994), who wrote about increasing level of insecurities that more and more people were facing with. Uchitelle argued that as the stock of people with lower socio-economic security had increased, people no longer accused employers, but they rather looked for the cause of that at the systemic level. As a consequence, they lost their trust in government and governmental institutions and started blaming them for the problems. Espenshade and Hempstead tested the hypotheses empirically and found that social and political alienation do have an important impact on attitudes towards immigrants – people who are dissatisfied with different aspects of their lives and who feel that politicians don't care about their needs have more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

The above described relationship might not be direct, but rather mediated through people's socio-economic characteristics and economic security. Kehrberg (2007) added another possible mediator, by setting the concept of political tolerance (Gaasholt, Togeby 1995: 275) into the light of attitudes towards immigrants. He said that low level of political tolerance, which is defined as lack of 'willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes' (Sullivan et al 1979: 784) leads to negative attitudes towards immigration, as political tolerance shapes political culture and can, in addition, have an impact on the severity of political and cultural conflicts between natives and immigrants. Institutional trust that is in the focus of this paper is a component of political tolerance.

In this paper we go further from political alienation approach by combining it with the topic of trust, and explore the relationship between trust in institutions as a component of political trust and attitudes towards immigrants. Similar studies from different angles have been carried out by Husfeldt (2004) and McLaren (2010). Husfeldt studied students attitudes towards immigrants and sources of these based on IEA Civic Education Study and found that trust in government-related institutions seemed to prevent students from having negative attitudes towards immigrants (Husfeldt 2004). Linkage between the two variables was also found by McLaren (2010), although another direction of the causality was assumed in her paper.

The causality is a controversial issue when it comes to relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and trust in institutions. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) claim that people with high level of social trust are more willing to face the higher risks that go with trusting people with different cultural background. Elaborating this idea, people with higher level of institutional trust could also be treated as more risk-taking. As written before, institutional trust assumes a readiness to take risks (to let others make important decisions for oneself). If we treat institutional trust as a feature that describes person's risk-taking behaviour, the causal relationship between institutional trust and attitudes towards immigrants should be justified. McLaren (2010, 2012) on the contrary expected the causality to work in the opposite way. She argues that the people who perceive that immigrants threaten their communities are likely to feel a weaker connection to elites and institutions, which were originally designed to govern a national community.

Since we elaborate the idea of political alienation and the studies in that field have expected political distrust to have an impact on attitudes towards immigration, we treat institutional trust as exogenous variable. However, instead of emphasizing on the causality, we rather concentrate on providing new evidence on the relationship between trust and attitudes. Our main purpose is to test whether controlling for other theoretical approaches, trust in institutions is the most significant variable explaining variability of people's attitudes towards immigrants among ethnic minority and majority populations in Europe, or not.

2.4. Other theoretical considerations explaining attitudes towards immigrants

To test the hypotheses about relationship between institutional trust and attitudes towards immigrants we control for the most common theoretical approaches that explain the determinants of the attitudes: individual economic theories, human capital theory, contact theory, cultural marginality theory, societal integration theory and neighbourhood safety theory.

According to individual economic theories, individuals with less economic security (i.e. with a lower level of education, lack of skills, lower level of financial resources) tend to have more intolerant attitudes towards immigrants. An explanation for this comes from neoclassical economic theory and trade theory. When a labour supply increases due to immigration, competition on the labour market becomes tougher. Moreover, the locals' wages (at least in some skill groups) will decrease. As immigrants tend to be over represented in low-skilled jobs, then low-skilled natives are more likely to harbour anti-immigrant attitudes. It has also been established that highly-skilled individuals are more likely to adopt tolerant attitudes towards immigration than low-skilled, and this effect is greater in richer countries than in poorer countries, and in more equal countries than in more unequal ones (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006).

Human capital theory claims that a higher level of education leads to a higher level of tolerance. One channel for this is via improved skills and higher qualifications. Economic security acquired in this way repositions individuals so that they don't have to compete with immigrants on the labour market (Mayda 2006). Another channel involves education

broadening people's horizons, which might lead to increased tolerance. A higher level of education also contributes to political and social engagement.

Experiences of migration and the level of personal contact also matters. The individual approach to contact theory says that having a considerable number of immigrants in a neighbourhood increases the level of perceived threat. Therefore, more casual contacts with immigrants can mean intolerant attitudes. On the other hand, having more personal contact with immigrants can lead to a higher level of tolerance because natives' knowledge of immigrants will improve and they will not be seen as that much of a social threat (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998, McLaren 2003). The variable that we use to control for that approach is person's experiences of working abroad, assuming that people who have been immigrants themselves (even if just for a rather short period of time) have more likely personal contacts with people from abroad, which might have a positive impact on their attitudes towards immigrants in general.

According to cultural marginality theory, attitudes towards immigrants are more tolerant when local people can understand immigrants. People who have belonged to minority groups that have been discriminated against tend to be more tolerant towards other groups in similar situations (Allport 1954). In our study we separate two groups of people – ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities. We also use the variable which gives us information about people's belongings to different discriminated groups.

While understanding other people is a matter of willingness on the one hand, it also depends on one's social trust, i.e. trust in other people, as social trusters are more likely to respect the rights of others (Putnam 2000, p. 137). Herreros and Criado (2009) elaborated the thought by claiming that one's high level of social trust doesn't only mean more trust in people with similar cultural background, but extends to people from different cultural or ethnic backgrounds. They draw an explanation of that from the concept of social intelligence (Yamagishi 2001). According to that, people with high level of social trust are more willing to face the higher risks that go with trusting people with different cultural background. The willingness comes from the understanding that cooperating with strangers might be in their interest and, therefore, it's not reasonable to distrust anyone unless they have cheated on them. The experiences, both positive and negative, lead to acquisition of social intelligence – i.e. understanding one's own and other people's internal states (Yamagishi and Kikuchi 1999: 155) that diminishes chances of blaming immigrants on every negative aspects of life and contribute to more positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Explanation of neighbourhood safety theory, inversely, comes from blaming immigrants even without any direct contacts with them. Chandler and Tsai (2001), who studied the relationship between the feeling of safety and attitudes towards immigration, have found a weak positive relationship between the two variables. If people are afraid to walk around their neighbourhood in the dark, and they blame immigrants for criminal activity and violence, then their attitudes towards immigrants are probably negative. This relationship might be partially mediated by social trust.

3. Empirical evidence: the determinants of people's attitudes towards immigrants

3.1. Data

We used European Social Survey (ESS) 4th round database in order to explore whether trust in institutions is related to the attitudes towards immigrants. The data was collected in 2008 and the database included information for 30 countries. We estimated our cross-section OLS regression models based on data from 30 600 respondents from 27 countries. Among others, data for Israel and Turkey was used. Data from the respondents from Bulgaria, Cyprus and Slovak Republic was neglected, because some of the important variables used in the analyses were missing for these countries.

Our main aim was to test the relationship between trust in institutions and attitudes towards immigrants. We controlled the relationship for several other variables that enabled us to take into consideration the most common theoretical approaches describing the sources of the attitudes. The list of variables used for controlling the different theories is presented in table 1.

Table 1. List of variables used for controlling for the theoretical approaches under review

Theoretical approach	Variables
Trust in institutions	Trust in parliament Trust in legal system Trust in the police Trust in politicians Trust in political parties
Individual economic theories	Employment status Unemployment longer than 3 months during past 5 years Household's total net income Stance to economic security in the future (How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months)
Human capital theory	Highest level of education
Contact theory (individual approach)/Cultural marginality theory	Living abroad for more than 5 month during past 5 years Belonging to a minority group (we divided into two) Being ever discriminated against
Societal integration theory	Interpersonal trust Living with a partner Living with kids
Neighbourhood safety theory	Feeling safe in dark
Other control variables	Age Gender Domicile

In case of some variables the initial indicators of the ESS database were recoded and/or aggregated into smaller groups. Information about labour market status is presented in three categories: 1 – employed, 2 – unemployed, 3 – out of labour force. Information about households' incomes is aggregated into three groups: lowest, middle and highest income groups, which represent the 1st-4th, 5th-7th and 8th-10th deciles of the income distribution

respectively. ISCED-97 (*International Standard Classification of Education*) coding system was used to present information about the respondents' highest level of education. Based on that three groups were composed – people with low level of education presenting those whose highest level of education corresponds to ISCED 0-2 (0 – not completed primary education; 1 – primary or first stage of basic education; 2 – lower secondary or second stage of basic education), middle level of education presenting ISCED 3 and 4 (3 – upper secondary education, 4 – post secondary, non-tertiary education) and high level of education which corresponds to ISCED 5 and 6 (5 – first stage of tertiary; 6 – second stage of tertiary). The respondents place of living was coded into three groups: countryside (a farm or home in countryside); village or town (a town or a small city; country village); city (a big city; suburbs or outskirts of a big city). The full list of the indicators and their categories is presented in appendix 1.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics: share of selected sample

Variable	Majority	Minority
Gender - male	0,487	0,537
<i>Highest level of education</i>		
Low	0,270	0,282
Medium	0,401	0,391
High	0,330	0,327
<i>Employment status</i>		
Employed	0,569	0,574
Inactive	0,380	0,326
Unemployed	0,051	0,101
Has been unemployed at least once for more than 3 months during past 5 years	0,283	0,362
<i>Income level</i>		
Low income	0,396	0,503
Medium income	0,316	0,283
High income	0,287	0,215
Belongs to a discriminated group	0,061	0,290
Has worked abroad for more than 6 months during past five years	0,054	0,092
Lives with partner	0,635	0,619
Lives with children	0,399	0,465
<i>Domicile</i>		
Rural	0,349	0,268
Town	0,311	0,297
Metropolitan	0,349	0,435
Number of cases (N)	28844	1756

Our analyses cover people in the age 15-90. There are 28844 people included into the analyses of ethnic majority populations and 1756 people into the analyses of ethnic minorities' attitudes towards immigrants. More detailed descriptive statistics is presented in table 2. Both of the subsamples are with similar structure. Some of the biggest differences

occur, when taking a look at the employment status and income. While the share of unemployed people is 5,1% among ethnic majorities, the same indicator is at the level of 10,1% among the other group. The income distribution of ethnic minorities is also more strongly downward inclined.

It's not very surprising that the share of people who belong to any discriminated group is more than four times higher among ethnic minorities. However, even among ethnic majorities there are 6,1% of people who consider themselves to belong to some discriminated group. The share of people who had been working abroad for six months or longer during the five years before the survey is a bit higher among ethnic minorities. The descriptive statistics about respondents' area of living shows that metropolitans are much more diverse than rural areas – 43,5% of the ethnic minorities of the sample lived in metropolitans.

3.2. Aggregated indicators of attitudes

In addition to the aforementioned aggregation of several indicators, we also used principal components factor analysis to elaborate the aggregated indicators of the attitudes of people. The aggregated indicators characterize our dependent variable – people's attitudes towards immigrants – and the explanatory variable in focus – trust in a country's institutions. The results of the factor analysis are presented in table 3.

Table 3. The results of the factor analysis: factor loadings and factors, the aggregated indicators of attitudes

Question	Factors	
	Attitudes towards immigration	Trust in institutions
1. Immigration bad or good for country's economy	0,871	
2. Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	0,885	
3. Immigrants make country worse of better place to live	0,894	
4. Trust in country's parliament		0,863
5. Trust in the legal system		0,823
6. Trust in the police		0,750
7. Trust in politicians		0,886
8. Trust in political parties		0,862
KMO, Measure of Sampling Adequacy	0,733	0,804
% of Variance	78,0	70,2
N	48159	45978

Method: Principal Components, weighted by DWEIGHT

Source: authors' calculations based on the ESS 4th round data

In the subsequent analyzes we use the factor scores of the aggregated indicators of attitudes (attitudes towards immigration and trust in institutions), which characterize the level of these indicators as proxies of attitudes in the case of every respondents. Factor scores are

standardized indicators and the values of them range as a set of rule of minus 3 to plus 3. The exceptional cases show that these respondents have very low (minus) or very high (plus) score of attitudes; the average level is indicated as zero.

To get the first insight into the differences of the attitudes towards immigrants and trust in institutions across the countries, we visualized country means of both of the factors across countries on figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows that the mean level of minority population attitudes towards immigrants doesn't follow the pattern of the majority population attitudes. In most of the countries minority populations seems to be more tolerant towards immigrants. Somewhat interestingly, in Israel, where majority population seems to be rather tolerant towards immigrants, the attitudes of minority population are way more negative than in the other countries that rank highly according to the attitudes of ethnic majority. The United Kingdom is at the same an example of the opposite as the level of its minority population' attitudes towards immigrants is high, while the same indicator among ethnic majority is below the average of the 27 countries. Wider confidence intervals of the means of the minority population attitudes towards immigrants should be noticed, though. It is caused by the fact that the sizes of the two groups were rather different in all of the countries. Vast majority of the sampled people in each of the 27 countries belonged to ethnic majority. The minority populations are also more heterogeneous.




Figure 1. Mean of the aggregated indicator of individuals' attitudes towards immigrants in the 27 countries and its 95% confidence interval. Countries are ordered by the mean of the indicator among ethnic majorities

Source: authors' calculations based on the ESS 4th round data




Figure 2. Mean levels of the aggregated indicator of majority and minority populations' trust in institutions and its 95% confidence intervals in 27 European countries. Countries are ordered by their overall means of trust in institution.

Source: authors' calculations based on the ESS 4th round data

Figure 2 shows that the level of trust in institutions, similarly to attitudes towards immigrants, varies widely across countries. It is the highest in Nordic countries and the lowest in the former Soviet republics. Western-European countries are in the middle of the range. There are also some differences between the majority and minority populations, but the differences are more modest than in the case of the attitudes towards immigrants. The graph demonstrates that ethnic minorities have lower level of trust in institutions in Estonia, Israel, Czech Republic and Turkey. Somewhat surprisingly, the minorities trust in institutions seems to be more positive than the one of majority populations' in United Kingdom, Ireland, Romania and Portugal.

3.3. Empirical results

In our empirical analysis we separated two groups of people – majority and minority populations – in each of the countries, whereas the distinction was made based on the respondents' answers to the question “Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]”. To our knowledge, this is so far the first paper on the attitudes towards immigration that uses that kind of separation of people. Although that approach might have some downsides related to the different sizes and heterogeneity of the groups, we find it to be important, as majority population attitudes towards immigrants might be rather different from the ones of minority population and the determinants of the attitudes might be different as well.

We estimated OLS regression models of the determinants of the attitudes towards immigrants for both of the groups using the aggregated indicator of peoples' attitudes towards immigration as a dependent variable. Explanatory variables were respondents' personal characteristics (age, gender, employment status, highest level of education, type of living area, etc.), factor scores of the aggregated indicator of trust in institutions, respondents' estimations about their future well-being and their feeling of safety. Country dummies were used as proxies of country specific conditions (share of minority population among others), and the estimated parameters of the country dummies were considered as country effects. The estimated model is presented in table 4 (country dummies not shown).

Table 4. OLS estimators of the model describing European people's attitudes towards immigration, robust standard errors in brackets

	Majority		Minority	
	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients
Trust in institutions	0,197*** (0,008)	0,200	0,159*** (0,033)	0,157
<i>Individual economic theories:</i>				
<i>Employment status (ref: employed)</i>				
Unemployed	0,017 (0,031)	0,004	-0,176 (0,109)	-0,051
Out of labour force	0,026* (0,015)	0,013	-0,016 (0,070)	-0,007
Unemployed for more than 3 months during past 5 years	0,032** (0,013)	0,015	0,100* (0,059)	0,045
<i>Income level (ref: low)</i>				
Medium	0,030** (0,015)	0,015	-0,004 (0,065)	-0,001
High	0,100*** (0,017)	0,047	0,003 (0,080)	0,001
How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months	-0,041*** (0,008)	-0,039	-0,057 (0,036)	-0,052
<i>Human capital theory:</i>				
<i>Highest level of education (ref: low)</i>				
Medium	0,122*** (0,015)	0,062	0,046 (0,071)	0,021
High	0,327*** (0,016)	0,159	0,159** (0,077)	0,069
<i>Contact theory/Cultural marginality theory:</i>				
Belongs to a discriminated group	0,031 (0,027)	0,008	0,249*** (0,065)	0,106
Has worked abroad	0,123***	0,029	0,049	0,013

	Majority		Minority	
	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients
	(0,025)		(0,091)	
<i>Societal integration theory:</i>				
Interpersonal trust	0,061*** (0,003)	0,155	0,061*** (0,013)	0,141
Lives with partner	-0,027** (0,013)	-0,013	-0,012 (0,060)	-0,005
Lives with children	-0,037*** (0,013)	-0,019	0,019 (0,061)	0,009
<i>Neighbourhood safety theory:</i>				
Doesn't think that it's very dangerous to walk in the dark	0,129*** (0,008)	0,106	0,127*** (0,040)	0,098
<i>Control variables:</i>				
Gender - male	-0,034*** (0,011)	-0,018	0,066 (0,054)	0,030
Age	0,007*** (0,002)	0,124	-0,021** (0,010)	-0,301
Age squared	-0,000*** (0,000)	-0,173	0,000 (0,000)	0,256
<i>Domicile (ref: rural)</i>				
Town	0,082*** (0,014)	0,039	0,143** (0,071)	0,061
City	0,140*** (0,014)	0,068	0,210*** (0,071)	0,095
Constant	-1,126*** (0,062)		-0,608* (0,312)	
Number of cases (N)	28844		1756	
Prob>F	0,000		0,000	
R ²	26,5		26,2	

*** $p < 0,01$; ** $p < 0,05$; * $p < 0,1$. Dependent variable: factor scores of the aggregated indicator of individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Country dummies are included, but not shown here. Weighted by DWEIGHT.

Source: authors' calculations based on the ESS 4th round data

The empirical findings confirm the importance of institutional trust in predicting the attitudes towards immigrants. According to our models the trust in institutions is one of the factors that is most strongly related to the attitudes towards immigration, when controlled for the most common theoretical considerations that explain the determinants of the attitudes. The finding is important as it gives a strong signal about the importance of enhancing peoples' trust in institutions. Unlike the suggestions that might be drawn from the relevance of other theoretical approaches, the one presented here is directly under control of countries' institutions and thereby clearly feasible.

Trust in institutions seems to be slightly stronger source of the attitudes among majority populations (standardized coefficient 0,200) than among minority populations (standardized

coefficient 0,157). It might be due to the distance between the institutions and minority populations. Bearing that in mind, different strategies should be used for reaching these two groups to enhance their trust in institutions. Activities directed at raising transparency of institutions, reducing the amount of corruptive and egoistic behaviour are important to increase the overall level of trust. However, special measures should be taken to enhance the institutional trust among ethnic minorities. Especially in the countries where the trust in institutions among this groups is lower (see figure 2). It's especially important to avoid increasing stock of immigrants becoming a barrier of facilitating tolerant environment for attracting global talent pool.

The empirical findings also show that besides our main focus – trust in institutions – social trust, which according to some researchers is weakly or not at all related correlated to institutional trust is also an important determinant of peoples' attitudes towards immigration. This variable is equally important among both of the groups. The finding goes with the results of Herreros and Criado (2009) and Rustenbach (2010) and confirms the validity of societal integration theory. Other variables used acted more differently among the two groups justifying our approach of separating them. According to our findings, people who belong to ethnic majority and who have kids living in their households are less tolerant towards immigration than people living with kids. The direction of the relation appeared to be opposite among ethnic minorities. Living with a partner was statistically important for majority populations' attitudes only leading to more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

The results of testing the economic theories show that economic variables are more important in determining the attitudes towards immigrants among ethnic majorities. For this group all aspects of economic confidence – present (measured by current labour force status and income), past (measured by experiences of unemployment during past 5 years) and future (measured by the subjective estimation on future well-being) – are statistically significantly (though weakly) related to attitudes towards immigrants. Surprisingly, being unemployed for 3 months or more during the period of 5 years before the survey occurred to be positively correlated to attitudes towards immigrants. Among ethnic minorities none of the variables is statistically significant at the 0,95 confidence level. It gives some signals that ethnic majorities (despite being on a stronger position in their local labour markets) feel more endangered by increasing competition on the labour market.

According to our findings, human capital theory also seems to work mainly for ethnic majorities. People who belong to ethnic majorities have the more positive attitudes towards immigrants the higher their level of education, whereas group having higher education (ISCED 5 or 6) contributes more to positive attitudes towards immigrants than having medium level of education (ISCED 3-4) compared to the people with low level of education (ISCED 0-2). Among ethnic minorities, statistically significant differences only between the people with low and high education. People whose highest level of education corresponds to ISCED 5 or 6 have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than the people whose highest level of education corresponds to the ISCED 0, 1 or 2.

Contact theory and cultural marginality theory were partially confirmed. The results demonstrate that ethnic minorities, who belong to a group that is discriminated against in their country (the basis of the discrimination might be colour or race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic group, age, gender, sexuality, disability or something else, according to the ESS questionnaire) have more positive attitudes towards immigration. The relation is insignificant for ethnic majorities. It might be due to the fact that people who belong to ethnic minorities have way higher probability of belonging into a group discriminated against. However, it shouldn't be taken as a rule that every person who belongs to ethnic minority belongs to a group discriminated against as well. In our sample 6,1% of ethnic majorities had argued that they had ever belonged to a group discriminated against. The same indicator was 29,0% among ethnic minorities. Experience of working abroad has a positive relationship with attitudes towards immigrants only among ethnic majorities. The explanation might be drawn from the fact that ethnic minorities don't need that channel for understanding immigrants as they probably belong into the group. For ethnic majorities who might not communicate with immigrants in their country, on the other hand, it might be one of a few channels for gaining an experience of immigration and starting to understand the migrants living in their home country better.

The relationship between the area where one lives and his/her attitudes towards immigrants which has been discussed by Wirth (1938) was found to exist for both of the groups. People who live in a village, town or city have more positive attitudes towards immigrants compared to the people living in rural areas. Neighbourhood safety theory also works for both of the groups. People who are not afraid of walking around in their neighbourhood when it's dark have more positive attitudes towards immigration than people who are afraid of that.




Figure 3. Country effects of the model of ethnic majority population's attitudes towards immigration. (Reference category: Belgium)

Source: authors' calculations based on the ESS 4th round data

Note: The statistically significant parameters are presented in blue, the insignificant ones in red.




Figure 4. Country effects of the model of ethnic minority population's attitudes towards immigration. (Reference category: Belgium)

Source: authors' calculations based on the ESS 4th round data

Note: The statistically significant parameters are presented in blue, the insignificant ones in red.

Figures 3 and 4 present the country specific effects that can reflect different reasons for the variability of the respondents' attitudes towards immigrants at country level. Possible country specific conditions that may form the respondents' attitudes towards immigration beside their individual characteristics can include the number of migrants in the country, the composition of the migrant group, country size, the historical and political background of the country (path-dependence), the level of economic development (GDP pc), etc.

4. Conclusion and discussion

We tried to shed some new light on the discussions about attitudes towards immigrants in this paper. We showed that trust to institutions which is one part of a wider concept of political trust and interpersonal trust have the strongest explanatory power when analysing the predictors of people's attitudes towards immigrants. The interpersonal (social) trust is similarly related to the attitudes towards immigrants among majority and minority populations. Trust in institutions, on the other hand, has slightly stronger connection with the attitudes in case of ethnic majorities. As we also showed, it might be due the lower level of trust in institutions among ethnic minorities.

The finding is important as it clearly emphasizes the importance of fair, selfless and transparent governance in order to create a tolerant environment that would help attracting global talent pool. Facchini and Mayda (2008) have shown that countries where a median voter tends to be against immigration tend to implement more restrictive migration policies. Contrasting our finding, which says that higher level of political trust is positively related to pro-immigrant attitudes to that, less restrictive immigration policies could also be seen as a result of higher level of trust in institutions. This is the channel how more transparent and trustworthy governance would make it easier to become an attractive destination country for global talents.

As mentioned, trust in institutions is differently related to attitudes towards immigrants among ethnic majorities and minorities. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the determinants of people's attitudes towards immigrants by separating these two groups and the distinguishing justified itself. Knowing that trust in institutions has stronger relation with attitudes towards immigrants among ethnic majorities and that the overall level of trust in institutions seems to be somewhat smaller among ethnic minorities in some countries refer to the need of different measures when trying to tackle the issue among both of the groups. It's important to raise transparency of institutions and reducing the amount of corruptive behaviour to increase the overall level of trust in institutions. In case of ethnic minorities additional measures are needed in order to lessen distance between the institutions and them. As said, it is especially important to avoid increasing stock of immigrants becoming a barrier for facilitating tolerant environment for attracting high-skilled people from other countries.

The other biggest differences among ethnic minorities and majorities were found to be related to economic factors and the variables that tested for contact theory and cultural marginality theory. Relationship between economic factors and attitudes towards immigrants appeared to be weak and statistically significant for ethnic majorities only. Contacts with other people in harmful situations via belonging to a discriminated group increase minority populations' attitudes towards immigrants. Contacts with immigration via work experience abroad, on the other hand, lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants among ethnic majorities.

References

- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley
- Andreescu, V. (2011). Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy in United Kingdom. *Journal of Identify and Migration Studies*. Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 61-85.
- Berg, L., Hjerm, M. (2010). National Identity and Political Trust. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 390-407.
- Bianco, William T. (1994). *Trust: Representatives and Constituents*. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press.
- Bjønnskov, C., Svendsen, G. T. (2012). Does social trust determine the size of the welfare state? Evidence using historical identification. *Public Choice*. VIIDE LÕPETAMATA

- Braithwait, V., Levi, M. (1998). *Trust and Governance*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation
- Chandler, C. R., Tsai, Y. (2001). Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey. *The Social Science Journal*, Vol. 38, pp. 177-188
- Council of Europe (2012). *Annual Report on ECRI's Activities*.
- Delhey, J., Newton, K. (2005). Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism? *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 21, pp. 311-27.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Eek, D., Rothstein, B. (2005). Exploring a Causal Relationship between Vertical and Horizontal Trust. *QOC Working Paper Series*, Vol. 4, pp. 41.
- Espenshade, T. J., Hempstead, K. (1996). Contemporary American Attitudes Towards U.S. Immigration. *International Migration Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 535-570.
- ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data, 2008. Data file edition 3.0. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.
- European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. (2005). *Majorities' Attitudes Towards Minorities: Key Findings from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey*. 40 p.
- Facchini, G., Mayda, A. M. (2008). From Individual Attitudes Towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence. Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 6835.
- Gaasholt, U., Tøgeby, L. (1995). *I syv sind: Danskernes holdninger til fl ygtninge og indvandre*. Århus, Denmark: Forlaget Politica.
- Hernes, G., Knudsen, K. (1992). Norwegians attitudes toward new immigrants. *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 35, pp. 123-139.
- Herreros, F., Criado, H. (2009). Social Trust, Social Capital and Perceptions of Immigration. *Political Studies*, Vol. 57, pp. 337-355.
- Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The Political Relevance of Political Trust. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 791-808.
- Husfeldt, V. (2004). Negative attitudes towards Immigrants: Explaining factors in Germany, Switzerland, England, and Denmark. In C. Papanastasiou (Ed.). *Conference Proceedings of the 1st IEA International Research Conference*, pp. 57-68. Nikosia: IEA.
- International Organization for Migration. (2011). *World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively About Migration*, p. 158.
- Kehrberg, J. E. (2007). Public Opinion on Immigration in Western Europe: Economics, Tolerance, and Exposure. *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 5, pp. 264-281.
- Lee, A. J., Yu, T. (2009). Towards a Dynamic and Composite Model of Trust. SACMAT '09 Proceedings of the 14th ACM symposium on Access control models and Technologies, pp. 217-226
- Levi, M., Stoker, L (2000). Political Trust and Trustworthiness. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 3, pp. 475-507.

- Masso, A. (2009). A Readiness to Accept Immigrants in Europe? Individual and Country-Level Characteristics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 251-270
- Mayda, A. M. (2006). Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward immigrants. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 510-530.
- McLaren, L. M. (2003). Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants. *Social Forces*, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 909-936.
- McLaren, L. M. (2010). Cause for concern? The impact of immigration on political trust. *Policy Network Paper*, 40 p.
- Miller, A. H. (1974). Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism? *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, pp. 989-1001.
- Newton, K. (2001). Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy. *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 201-214.
- Newton, K. (2012). Taking a bet with ourselves. Can we put trust in trust? [http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/publikationen/wzb_mitteilungen/wm135.gesamt.o.bilder.pdf#page=6] – VIIDE LÕPETAMATA
- O'Rourke, K. H., Sinnott, R. (2006). The Determinants of Individual Attitudes Towards Immigration. *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 22, pp. 838– 861.
- OECD (2010). International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2010. France, Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup Contact Theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 49, pp. 65-85.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Quillian, L. (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: population composition and anti-Immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp 586-612.
- Rustenbach, E. (2010). Sources of Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis. *International Migration Review*, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 53-77.
- Simmel, G. (1950). *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. Edited by K. H. Wolff. Translated by K. H. Wolff. New York: Free Press.
- Stokes, D. E. (1962). Popular Evaluations of Government: And Empirical Assessment. In *Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political, and Military*, by ed. Cleveland, H. and Lasswell, H. D., pp. 61-72. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., Marcus, G. E. (1979). An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s-1970s. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp 781-794.
- Torney-Purta, J., Richardson, W. K., Barber, C. H. (2004). Trust in Government-Related Institutions and Civic Engagement among Adolescents: Analysis of Five Countries from the IEA Civic Education Study. CIRCLE Working Paper No. 17.
- Uchitelle, L. (1994). The Rise of the Losing Class. *The New York Times*, November 20, Section 4, p.1.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision* (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

Wilson, T. C. (1991). Urbanism, Migration, and Tolerance: A Reassessment. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 117-123.

World Bank (2011). *The Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*. 2nd edition.

Yamagishi, T. (2001). Trust as A Form of Social Intelligence, in K. Cook (ed.), *Trust in Society*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 121–47.

Yamagishi, T., Kikuchi, M. (1999). Trust, guillibility, an social intelligence. *Asian Journal of Social Pshychology*, Vol. 2, pp. 145-161.

Yamagishi, T., Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. *Motivation and Emotion*, Vol. 18, pp. 129-166.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Variables used in the analyzes

Variable	Coding
<i>Attitudes towards immigration:</i>	
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	0 – Bad for the economy ... 10 – Good for the economy
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	0 – Cultural life undermined ... 10 – Cultural life enriched
Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0 – Worse place to live ... 10 – Better place to live
<i>Trust in institutions:</i>	
Trust in country's parliament	0 – No trust at all ... 10 – Complete trust
Trust in the legal system	0 – No trust at all ... 10 – Complete trust
Trust in the police	0 – No trust at all ... 10 – Complete trust
Trust in politicians	0 – No trust at all ... 10 – Complete trust
Trust in political parties	0 – No trust at all ... 10 – Complete trust
<i>Economic theories:</i>	
Employment status	1 – Employed 2 – Unemployed 3 – Out of labour force
Unemployment (3 months or more) during past 5 years	1 – Yes 0 – No
Income	Low – 1 st -4 th deciles Medium – 5 th -7 th deciles High – 8 th -10 th deciles
How likely not enough money for household necessities next 12 months (Estimation of future economic security)	1 – Not at all likely 2 – Not very likely 3 – Likely 4 – Very likely
<i>Human capital theory:</i>	
Highest level of education	Low – ISCED 0-2 Medium – ISCED 3-4 High ISCED 5-6
<i>Contact theory (individual approach)/Cultural marginality theory:</i>	
Ever belonged to a group discriminated against in a country	1 – Yes 0 – No
Experience of working abroad	1 – Yes 0 – No
<i>Societal integration theory:</i>	
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful (Interpersonal trust)	0 – You can't be too careful ... 10 – Most people can be trusted
Living with a partner	1 – Yes 0 – No
Lives with children	1 – Children living in household 0 – No children living in household
<i>Neighbourhood safety theory:</i>	
Feeling of safety when walking in the neighbourhood	1 – Very unsafe ... 4 – Very safe
<i>Control variables:</i>	
Age	15 - 90
Gender	1 – Female 0 – Male
Type of living area	1 – Countryside 2 – Village or town 3 – City